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Disparities in the Cost of Living Changes after a Large-Scale Devaluation: 
The Case of Egypt 2016 
 
Shireen Alazzawi and Vladimir Hlasny  
 
December 30, 2018 
 
In November 2016 Egypt went through a massive devaluation of its currency. This was followed 
by a jump in prices, particularly for traded goods including food, and particularly in Rural 
Lower, Rural Upper and Urban Lower regions. Using data from the Central Bank of Egypt and 
microdata from the 2008-2015 Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Surveys, this 
study investigates the pass-through of exchange rate changes to prices of various commodities 
across all regions and, through households’ consumption and substitution patterns, the 
implications for households’ cost of living and welfare. Predictions of the one-month and six-
month impacts of the November 2016 devaluation are made. Our results show that typically 4% 
of exchange rate changes are passed through to prices immediately, and cumulatively 
approximately 9% are passed through over the six months after devaluation. Accounting for 
households’ consumption patterns, we compute fixed-weight Laspeyres price indices and cost of 
living indices to compare the impact of the devaluation to a counterfactual scenario without it. 
We find that the cost of living of an average household rises by as much as 50% following the 
devaluation, and the household’s expenditure would have had to rise by twice as much after the 
devaluation to maintain its 2015 real expenditure level, compared to the counterfactual. These 
effects are higher still among households in the poorest income quintiles in all regions, according 
to all cost-of-living measures. 
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I. Motivation 
In November 2016 Egypt went through a rapid large-scale devaluation of its currency, 
exceeding 50% (refer to figure 1). A combination of factors led to this massive devaluation, 
including sharply dwindling foreign reserves and the desire to comply with IMF conditions for a 
new loan to the Egyptian government. This devaluation, from 8.78 to 17.63 to a dollar, came on 
the heels of sizable devaluations in January 2013 and March 2016.1 The large-scale declines in 
the value of the pound happened at a time of already weak economic performance and political 
instability following the 2011 uprising that toppled the 30-year rule of the Mubarak regime, the 
2013 coup d’etat, and the ensuing crackdown on groups seen to pose a risk to Egypt’s stability. 
A series of bombings targeting foreigner groups during 2015–2017 have kept tourism flows from 
recovering to their pre-2011 levels. 
The devaluations of the Egyptian pound were followed by spikes in inflation, particularly in 
food prices. In the spring of 2013 and 2016, prices jumped by approximately 15% year on year, 
and food prices by nearly 20% (refer to figures 1 and A1 in the appendix). Following the 2016 
devaluation, inflation rates soared above 30%, while food prices shot up by over 40%. Inflation 
rates continued above 30% until the fall of 2017 and remain well above their pre-2016 levels 
since. This high increase in the cost of living is likely to have affected the poor the most since 
they spend over 50% of their incomes on food, the category that witnessed the highest price 
increases after the currency devaluations. 
This study aims to advance our knowledge and contribute to existing literature in several 
ways: We use extensive and disaggregated data on product prices, input-output relations, and 
household budgets from multiple sources to study a major recent macroeconomic shock, the 
currency devaluation of November 2016. We use an advanced strategy to identify the 
distributional impacts for Egyptian households across geographic and economic dimensions, 
accounting for households’ both direct and substitution welfare effects. 
Namely, we try to answer the following questions: How are exchange rate fluctuations in the 
Egyptian pound passed through to prices of various commodity groups? What implications do 
                                                     
1 Value of the Pound fell from 6.13 to a dollar in Mid-December 2012 to 6.95 in mid-May 2013 (or by 13.4%), with 
the bulk of the devaluation occurring in January 2013. In mid-March 2016, the Pound fell again, from 7.73 to 8.85 to 
a dollar (by 14.5%). 
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currency devaluations have for households’ cost of living? Are these implications sensitive to the 
way the cost of living changes are computed, say by the Laspeyres’ type CPI produced by 
CAPMAS or by the true cost of living index? Did households in different regions and at different 
income levels experience varying rates of cost of living changes as a result of the devaluations? 
What are the consequences for inequality and poverty? Answering these questions is crucial for a 
proper assessment of the monetary shock, and for implementing an effective and well-targeted 
fiscal response. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the history of 
exchange rates and inflation in Egypt, and the existing academic literature linking exchange rate 
fluctuations and cost of living. Sections III and IV describe our estimation methods and the data 
used. Section V presents the main results, and section VI concludes with policy implications and 
directions for further research. 
 
II. Background and Existing Evidence 
The Egyptian economy suffered from high inflation levels chronically in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Prices were rising faster in rural areas and for the food and beverages group, and the 
lowest income groups faced the highest relative CPI increases (Zaghloul 1992). Using true cost 
of living indices (TCLIs) for Egypt over 1967 to 1997, AlAzzawi (1998) concluded that it was 
the urban poor who fared systematically worse in terms of cost of living increases than other 
groups. It took strong, and somewhat painful, policy measures to bring inflation down in the 
second half of the 1990s. Inflation fell to relatively low levels in the early 2000s. 
Following the floatation of the Egyptian Pound in 2003, however, the Pound depreciated 
(from 4.5 to 6.2 EGP/USD) and inflation for 2004 rose to near 12 percent. This led to welfare 
losses of an estimated 7.4 percent of household expenditures, disproportionally afflicted on the 
poor because of the sensitivity of food prices to exchange rates (Kraay 2007). Another 
devaluation took place in 2008, followed by a spike in inflation to double digits in the ensuing 
years. The higher inflation rates then persisted in much of the following decade, bringing large 
regional and socio-economic disparities in the cost of living. The increases in food prices have 
been found to particularly harm the poorest rural households (AlAzzawi 2017a,b). This is 
consistent with prior evidence that poor households tend to have relatively high expenditure 
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shares in tradable commodities (Cravino and Levchenko 2015a,b), and that low-quality products 
they buy are more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations than the high-quality variants 
(Antoniades and Zaniboni 2016; Auer et al. 2018). The cost of living of the poor is thus affected 
the most. 
 
III. Methods 
Exchange rate pass through 
The first challenge in estimating the welfare effects of currency fluctuations is isolating the 
role of currency exchange rates from that of other factors. We start by examining the extent to 
which currency devaluation affected prices of various commodities across Egypt, referred to as 
exchange rate pass-through. We use monthly consumer price index data for 12 main commodity 
categories and services (data on 59 disaggregated food and essential items featuring in household 
budgets are presently not utilized) for all the eight Egyptian regions between July 2008 and 
December 2017 to estimate disaggregated exchange rate pass-through regressions.2 These yield 
estimates of the exchange rate pass-through to prices of different types of goods and services as 
well as their regional variation. 
Specifically, the following empirical model is loosely adopted from Kraay (2007). The price 
of a good 𝑖 in region 𝑟 and month 𝑡, 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡, is modeled as having a non-tradable component 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑁  
and a tradable component 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑇 : 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡 = (𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑁 )𝛼𝑖𝑟 × (𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑇 )1−𝛼𝑖𝑟. The tradable price component can 
be modeled as a product of exchange rates 𝐸𝑡 and a measure of production costs in Egypt’s main 
trading partners 𝐶𝑡, where 𝐸𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡 are weighted by commodity- and region-specific 
parameters: 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡
𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡
𝛿1𝑖𝑟𝐶𝑡
𝛿2𝑖𝑟. Using the logarithmic transformation of 𝑃𝑖𝑟𝑡, we estimate the 
following reduced-form equation in percentage growth rates in variables (indicated by ∙): 
?̇?𝑖𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑟?̇?𝑟𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟?̇?𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑟?̇?𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑡    [1] 
 
                                                     
2 The 12 broad categories are: food and non-alcoholic beverages; alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; 
clothing and footwear; housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuel; furnishings, household equipment and routine 
house maintenance; health; transport; communications; culture and recreation; education; restaurants and hotels; 
miscellaneous goods and services. The eight regions are: Cairo; Alexandria; Suez Canal cities; Lower urban; Lower 
rural; Upper urban; Upper rural; Border region. 
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where 𝛽𝑖𝑟 is related to (1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑟)𝛿1𝑖𝑟 and 𝛾𝑖𝑟 is related to (1 − 𝛼𝑖𝑟)𝛿2𝑖𝑟. In this equation, the 
domestic price component 𝑃𝑟𝑡
𝑁  can be approximated from prices of purely domestically produced 
services weighted using their shares in aggregate consumption.3 𝐸𝑡 are computed using the 
exchange rates with Egypt’s most significant trading partners, weighted by their import shares. 
𝐶𝑡 are approximated using producer price indexes (PPIs) of the ten most significant importers to 
Egypt, again weighted by their import shares.4 In order to allow for delayed price adjustments to 
external factors, distributed lags of ?̇?𝑡 and ?̇?𝑡 up to a six-month lag are added. 
Coefficients 𝛼𝑖𝑟, 𝛽𝑖𝑟 and 𝛾𝑖𝑟 can be estimated individually using least squares regressions. 
The estimated coefficients are expected to be consistent for the true effects given that the 
explanatory variables and their lags appear exogenous, the pass-through regressions are fully 
specified, and the transformed variables have good properties, including stationarity and weak 
dependence (refer to figure 2). The coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point 
changes in the growth rate of the price index (?̇?𝑖𝑟𝑡) due to a one percentage point increase in the 
growth rate of nontradable-goods prices (?̇?𝑟𝑡
𝑁), growth rate of the trade-weighted exchange rate 
(?̇?𝑡), and growth rate of the price index in countries exporting to Egypt (?̇?𝑡). 
The coefficients on ?̇?𝑡 and its lags can be used to estimate the distributed-lag impacts of a 
one-time devaluation on prices of goods 𝑖 in regions 𝑟, say the immediate impact propensity in 
the month of devaluation (𝛽𝑖𝑟) or the long-run propensity six months after devaluation (𝛽𝑖𝑟 +
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑟
𝑘
𝑘=1,…,6  added up over the coefficients on all lags). These predictions are expected to be 
consistent for the true effects of even a large devaluation as long as the devaluation came about 
for external reasons not related unduly to domestic factor prices or consumer demand conditions 
– as is the case with the large-scale November 2016 devaluation. 
Finally worth noting, despite the variable transformations, heteroskedasticity may be a 
problem in the pass-through regressions due to the sporadic occurrence of large devaluations and 
                                                     
3 These are taken to be the following 14 commodity categories: clothes cleaning, repair and rental; shoe repair; 
outpatient services; hospital services; transport services; mail services; phone and fax services; culture and 
entertainment; cultural and recreational services; education; restaurants and hotels; catering; personal care; 
insurance. These categories account for 31.6% of households’ spending. To validate our classification of 
nontradable commodities, we find that rural and lower-income households spend significantly higher shares of their 
expenditures on tradable categories (refer to table A2 in the appendix), in agreement with prior evidence. 
4 China, Germany, Italy, Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, US. These countries accounted for 
54.7% of Egypt’s imports in 2016. 
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the associated jumps in variance of prices (as the Breusch-Pagan tests confirm). For this reason, 
coefficient standard errors are made robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. 
 
Consumption substitution response to price changes 
Changes in the cost of living due to currency devaluation or other factors are notoriously 
hard to estimate because of several challenges. First, rising prices in a given basket of goods, as 
measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), do not accurately measure changes in the cost of 
living due to a well-known substitution effect. Quality improvement, introduction of new goods, 
and seasonal variation in prices within a year are other well-known challenges. More importantly 
in the case of developing countries, distinct demographic groups have vastly different 
consumption patterns, and so a single consumption bundle is a purely theoretical concept that 
may not describe anyone in the economy. Accounting for housing cost inflation, and 
heterogeneity of housing and rent increases across demographic groups is a related specific 
challenge (Fares 1997). 
CPI does not differentiate the various demographic groups, while indexes accounting for 
heterogeneity across economic agents can produce different estimates of the cost of living 
changes across demographic groups. TCLI, the ratio of the minimum expenditures required to 
attain a particular standard of living at two different sets of prices, have been proposed as 
responding to these challenges more sensibly (Konüs 1936). TCLIs show much higher regional 
disparities in cost of living changes than the CPI (AlAzzawi 2017a,b). TCLI can be estimated 
using information on prices and consumption levels alone under basic assumptions about 
preference functions (Basmann et al. 1984, 1985a,b). 
To estimate the welfare effect of the devaluation on households it is customary to calculate 
the compensating variation that would be needed to keep households at the same utility level 
after the devaluation induced price changes: 𝐶𝑉 = 𝑒(𝑝1, 𝑢0) − 𝑒(𝑝0, 𝑢0). This compensating 
variation can be broken down into two estimable components, that due to the higher cost of the 
initial consumption bundle, and that due to the household’s substitution into different 
commodities as a response to the price changes. The compensating variation can be 
approximated as follows 
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𝐶𝑉
𝑒0⁄ ≈ ∑
(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)𝑤0
𝑝0
⁄ + 0.5 ∑ 𝑤0 [
(𝑥1 − 𝑥0)
𝑥0
⁄ − 𝑥𝑒 ∑ (𝑤0
(𝑥1 − 𝑥0)
𝑥0
⁄ )] [
(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)
𝑝0
⁄ ]  [2] 
 
where 𝑤0 is the share of each product category in households’ baseline expenditures 𝑒0, 𝑥𝑡 is the 
consumption of each product category, 𝑥𝑒 is the elasticity of consumption with respect to total 
expenditure, and the summations are over all product categories. Compensating variation could 
be estimated as a function of parameters and of a counterfactual change in prices only due to 
devaluation. To perform this calculation, however, we would need at least two household budget 
surveys that provide data on consumer expenditure patterns, one before and one after the 
devaluation. 
An alternative method to gauge the impact of devaluation on the welfare of different types of 
households is to calculate the increase in prices they faced if the devaluation had not taken place 
and compare it to the actual increase in prices they faced with the devaluation. The difference 
between the two gives a sense of how much worse the devaluation has been for these 
households. We begin by computing a Laspeyres-type price index similar to CAPMAS’s CPI, 
but based on the 12 commodity groups for which we have price and expenditure data. A 
Laspeyres price index is a fixed weight index, where the base period consumption patterns are 
used as weights, to track price changes over time. It has the following general form: 
n
oi ti
i=1
t,o n
oi oi
i-1
Q  P
I  =  X 100
Q P


     [3] 
where Qoi is the quantity of good i consumed during the base period 0 and Poi and Pti are the 
prices of good i in periods 0 and t, respectively. To be comparable with CAPMAS’s CPI series, 
we also use the weights derived from the 2008/2009 HIECS. 
 
 
True cost of living across Egyptian regions and income groups 
Rising prices as measured by the CPI do not accurately measure changes in the cost of living. 
A price index is a weighted average of prices, where the weight is fixed, taken to be the 
expenditure share allocated to each commodity in consumer expenditure budgets, either in the 
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base year (which gives rise to a Laspeyres Index) or in the current year (which gives rise to a 
Paasche index). It is the changing relative cost of a fixed basket of goods. It thus serves its 
purpose well: to monitor the extent of price changes over time. Over time, however, consumers 
can vary their preferences and this can lead to a bias in the fixed weight CPI in terms of how well 
it gauges cost of living changes. It ignores substitutions due to price changes and changes in 
consumer preferences due, for example, to past consumption and habit formation. It may 
overestimate cost of living changes if people resort to substitution when prices rise. It may 
underestimate cost of living changes in the case of taste changes and habit formation (Heien and 
Dunn 1985; Lieu et al. 2008). These biases in the CPI can lead to inaccurate estimation of the 
true changes in the cost of living, and any economic variables that rely on it for indexing. 
To accurately monitor changes in the cost of living, a “true” index of the cost of living, 
measured as the ratio of the minimum expenditures required to attain a particular utility level at 
two different price regimes (originally defined by Konüs 1936), is required. The true cost of 
living index proposed by Konüs (1936) compares “the monetary cost of two different 
combinations of goods which are connected solely by the condition that during the consumption 
of these two combinations, the general status of want-satisfaction (the standard of living) is the 
same” (Konüs 1936:10). Taking U° as the utility level of the base year and P° and P1 as the 
prices of the base period and the current period, respectively, the true cost of living index for U° 
is thus: 
C(P1, U°) / C(P°, U°)     [4] 
where C(P,U) is the cost of attaining utility level U at the price vector P. Therefore, the Konüs-
TCLI is defined for a specific utility function: it is ‘true’ in the sense that it is defined for price 
changes along a particular indifference curve that provides the same utility level, rather than a 
fixed bundle. There exists a separate ‘true’ cost of living index for each possible indifference 
surface (Diamond 1990:740). 
The first challenge in calculating the TCLI is therefore to find a particular utility function 
that captures consumer preferences well. Second, in practice when calculating the parameters of 
the model, one has to make restrictions on the total number of model parameters given that the 
estimation has to be performed on a limited number of aggregated commodity groups. These 
complications have meant that in practice statistical agencies around the world, including 
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CAPMAS, have resorted to fixed weight consumer price indices (CPI) to compute cost of living 
changes. 
A very convenient form of utility function that rationalizes the construction of a TCLI is the 
Generalized Fechner-Thurstone (GFT) direct utility function. We follow AlAzzawi (2017b) and 
compute TCLIs based on the GFT direct utility function. The advantage of the GFT-based TCLI 
is that it can be easily calculated without making any restrictive assumptions about the 
preferences of consumers. It does not require statistical estimation of the parameters of a system 
of demand functions that fit a specific utility function and the TCLIs are therefore termed non-
parametric. In addition, they have an important advantage in that the only data required for their 
estimation is the prices and expenditures for both the base and current periods. 
The TCLIs based on the GFT utility functions (detailed derivation presented in AlAzzawi 
2017b) are: 
    
0 0
i
n
M  / M1 0
i i
i = 1
GFT-TCLI (O) = (P /P )      [5] 
    
1 1
i
n
M  / M1 0
i i
i = 1
GFT- TCLI (1) = (P  / P )       [6] 
Where Pi
1 and Pi
0 are current and base period price levels, Mi is the expenditure on the ith 
commodity and M is the total expenditure in the period under consideration. The superscript 0 is 
for the base period and 1 is for the current period. Thus the non-parametric GFT-based TCLIs can 
be simply calculated from only price and expenditure data. Note that equation 5 is the same as the 
geometric average of relatives formula since the sum of the weights is 1. GFT-TCLI(0) is a TCLI 
where changes in taste between the base and the current periods are not considered. In the GFT-
TCLI(l), these taste changes are taken into consideration. The difference between the two reflects 
the effect of changes in taste due to price changes. 
 
IV. Data 
The most detailed data for this study come from four Household Income, Expenditure and 
Consumption Surveys (HIECSs) spanning the years 2008/2009, 2010/2011, 2012/2013, and 
2015. Unfortunately, at the time of our research, the 2018 HIECS data had not been released yet. 
The available HIECSs were collected by CAPMAS using nationally representative random 
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samples from urban and rural Egypt, and were harmonized and made available by the Economic 
Research Forum (OAMDI 2018 a,b,c,d). The surveys provide data on the household-level 
expenditure shares that can be aggregated to the level of socio-economic groups to calculate the 
weights for each commodity subgroup in the cost of living index.5 
The price data are from the CPI price series for the 12 main groups of commodities published 
by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS, various years) on a 
monthly basis for the period July 2008 to December 2017 for Egypt’s eight regions: Cairo, 
Alexandria, Suez Canal cities, Urban and Rural Lower Egypt, Urban and Rural Upper Egypt, and 
the Border region.6 
Official exchange rates for all available currencies are taken from the Central Bank of Egypt 
(2018).7 PPIs in all industrial activities in the ten countries with the highest import shares in 
Egypt are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRB 2018). To get single measures 
of exchange rates and production costs across Egypt’s trading partners, the country-specific 
exchange rates and PPIs are weighted by the partners’ share in Egypt’s imports, taken from the 
World Integrated Trade Solution database (World Bank 2018c). 
 
V. Results 
Our analysis of the welfare consequences of currency devaluation involved four steps: 
estimating the exchange rate pass through regressions; predicting the price effects of the 
November-2016 devaluation for all individual commodity groups in all Egyptian regions; 
                                                     
5 The surveys were conducted during April 2008–March 2009, July 2010–June 2011, July 2012–June 2013, and 
throughout the year 2015. Data collection took place through bi-weekly waves (weekly in 2015), during which 
distinct groups of households were surveyed. However, the timing of interview of individual households is not 
reported. This is unfortunate, given that important events such as devaluations or the civil uprising took place during 
the time span of fieldwork. (Complicating the matching of expenditures and prices in the 2015 HIECS, households 
were re-visited in the second half of the year to survey their seasonal expenditures and consumption.) 
6 Data for older periods are only available at the annual level, and for the 12 main categories. The 12 categories are: 
food & non-alcoholic beverages; tobacco; clothing & footwear; housing, water, electricity & fuels; furnishings, 
household equipment & routine house maintenance; health; transport; communication; culture & recreation; 
education; restaurant & hotel; miscellaneous. Additionally, in 2010 CAPMAS changed the basket of goods used to 
collect the price data for the CPI, and hence the data for the earlier period is not directly comparable. CAPMAS did 
publish a comparable series going back to July 2008, but not for earlier time periods. 
7 The currencies are: Australian Dollar, Bahraini Dinar, Canadian Dollar, Chinese Yuan, Danish Krone, Euro, 
Jordanian Dinar, Japanese Yen, Kuwaiti Dinar, Norwegian Krone, Omani Riyal, UK Pound Sterling, Qatari Riyal, 
Saudi Riyal, Swedish Krona, Swiss Franc, UAE Dirham, US Dollar. 
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predicting the substitution effects in households’ consumption patterns due to the price increases; 
and estimating the cost of living effects of the devaluation. This section presents the results of 
these estimations. 
 
Exchange rate pass through 
Tables 1 and 2 present the main results of the exchange-rate pass-through regressions, 
namely the immediate (same-month) and the longer-term (six-month) impact propensities of 
exchange rates on prices, indicated by the coefficients on ?̇?𝑡 (𝛽𝑖?̂?), and the sum of coefficients on 
all monthly lags (𝛽𝑖?̂? + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑟
?̂?
𝑘=1,…,6 ), respectively.
8 We find that, across all commodity groups 
and regions, the pass through of exchange rates is, on average, four percent within the first 
month, and nine percent over the six months after a one-time devaluation. When the Egyptian 
pound gets devalued by 100 percent (say, from 8.80 to 17.60 EGP/USD as in November 2016), 
domestic prices are predicted to rise by four percent immediately, and a further five percent over 
the next six months, relative to the counterfactual growth rate in the absence of the devaluation.  
This pass through is highest and most significant for highly tradable goods such as food, 
alcohol, apparel and equipment, and lowest or even negative significant for domestically 
produced, non-tradable goods such as communication services, cultural services, medical 
services, education and utilities (housing, water, electricity, gas and fuel), and restaurants and 
hotels. The pass through is highest in the Rural Upper, Rural Lower and Urban Lower regions, 
and lowest in Alexandria and the Suez Canal cities. The impact on the all-commodity price index 
is positive and highly significant in all regions (except for the 6-month impact in Alexandria, 
refer to Table 2). Over time, the impact evolves subject to different dynamic paths for different 
commodities and regions, as figure 3 illustrates. 
 
                                                     
8 Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix show the more complete results of the pass-through regressions including all 
coefficients and model measures of fit, for regressions run either by region or by commodity group. Regressions run 
by region and commodity group are available on request. In short, these extensive results agree with our 
expectations quite well, as most coefficients on ?̇?𝑟𝑡
𝑁 , ?̇?𝑡 and lags of ?̇?𝑡 are positive and significant, and the 
coefficients on ?̇?𝑡 are positive and significant in regressions of tradable goods (e.g., alcoexp, equipexp, foodbev), 
while they are often smaller or negative in regressions of non-tradable goods (e.g., commexp, cultexp, educexp, 
housexp, medexp). 
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Cost of living changes with and without devaluation: Regional disparities 
Tables 3–6 present the main results of the calculation of three measures of welfare changes 
due to price changes induced by devaluation – the Laspeyres price index (henceforth LPI), 
TCLI(0) and TCLI(1). Table 3 shows this for the mean household by region, while tables 4-6 
show the changes in the price index and the corresponding cost of living index in each quintile 
expenditure group. 
In Table 3, the top panel reports the values of the welfare indices for two months: December 
2016,9 1 month after the devaluation, corresponding to the immediate effects predicted in Table 
1; and for May 2017, 6 months after the devaluation, representing the long-term effect (Table 2). 
In columns 4-6 we report the actual LPI and TCLIs with the effect of devaluation incorporated in 
these indices. In columns 7-9 we report these indices after factoring out the impact of the 
devaluation using the coefficient estimates in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The bottom panel of 
the table reports the percentage change in these indices between December 2016 and May 2017, 
making it easier to see the impact of the devaluation on prices and cost of living changes. 
A few important observations are evident from Table 3. First, there are wide disparities in 
price and cost of living changes between regions whether the devaluation impact is incorporated 
or not. When the impact of devaluation is taken into consideration, Cairo faced the largest 
increases in prices and cost of living followed by Rural Lower and Border regions. 
The last three columns report the same indices once we factor out the impact of the 
devaluation and imply a significant impact of the devaluation on prices and cost of living that 
varied considerably between regions. For example, in Cairo, while prices increased by 18.6% 
between December 2016 and May 2017 with the devaluation impact, they would have only 
increased by 8.5% had the devaluation not taken place. The devaluation alone accounted for 
more than one-half of the observed increase in the LPI over this period. In Urban Lower Egypt 
prices would not have increased at all without devaluation over this period while cost of living 
might have actually declined. In the Canal cities and the Border region, the impact of the 
devaluation was the lowest, as predicted by the estimates in Tables 1 and 2. Alexandria 
                                                     
9 The official devaluation took place on November 4, 2016. Price data collected by CAPMAS are collected from the 
start of the month and therefore using the November price data for the immediate effect might bias the results since 
it would have taken some time for the full effect of the devaluation to take effect given the lag in importing 
contracts. 
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represents the only outlier in this respect with results suggesting that prices rose less with the 
devaluation than had it not occurred. This result is implausible. In fact, Alexandria’s 6-month 
coefficient carries a large standard error, and the confidence interval indicates that the effect of 
currency devaluation on regional prices may be large negative or even large positive. It may also 
have to do with Alexandria’s unique position and status as a port city relying on imports, and this 
may have bearing on consumers’ preferences and their response to the currency devaluation. 
This peculiar result will be investigated further once the 2018 HIECS data on consumer 
expenditure become available. 
Comparing the actual change in cost of living by both the TCLI(0) and TCLI(1) to their 
counterfactuals without devaluation also reveals the large and varying impact of the devaluation 
by region. In Cairo, Lower and Upper Egypt (both urban and rural) the devaluation caused one-
half or more of the observed increase in the cost of living. As mentioned above, the difference 
between TCLI(0) and TCLI(1) can be used to gauge the impact of the price change on consumer 
preferences. Clearly, price changes, both with the devaluation, and the counterfactual changes 
without, both have an impact on consumer preference as evidenced by the differences in the 
TCLI(0) and TCLI(1) indices. As theory indicates, there are instances where price increases can 
lead to substitutions that allow the consumers to maintain their utility levels while spending the 
same as before (such as in Rural Upper and Lower with devaluation), but in other regions, habit 
formation and dynamics under which previous consumption patterns dictate future purchases, 
price increases can actually lead to substitutions that raise the cost of living (all regions in 
columns 7-9 except Rural Upper and Border). 
The main conclusion from Table 3 is that the impact of the devaluation on the mean 
households was significant, raising the prices they faced and their cost of living by a significant 
portion of the overall increase in these measures over the 6 month following the devaluation. The 
magnitude of these effects varies by region. 
 
Income disparities in the welfare effect of the devaluation 
 Tables 4-6 present LPI and TCLI indices and their changes by income quintile. We began by 
calculating the mean consumption shares for each quintile and used those consumption shares to 
compute LPIs and TCLIs for each quintile. Results for the LPI in table 4 indicate that prices rose 
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as much or more for the lower quintiles than for the highest quintile in all regions. In Cairo for 
example prices rose by 23.2% between December 2016 and May 2017 for the lowest quintile, 
while they rose by 16.4% for the highest quintile. After factoring out the impact of the 
devaluation it appears that most of those price increases were devaluation induced. The bottom 
quintile, for example, would have faced only a 9.3% increase in prices (just 40% of the actual 
increase observed over this period), while the top quintile would have faced an 8.3% price 
increase (about one-half of the increase they actual faced). Thus, the extent to which the 
devaluation affected price inflation also varied considerably by income level. The lowest 
quintiles were the hardest hit in most regions. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn about the TCLIs by income quintile, presented in Tables 5 
and 6. The difference between the actual increase in cost of living (that includes the impact of the 
devaluation) and the counterfactual, had the devaluation not occurred, is in many regions largest 
by the TCLI(1) that is based on the variable preferences. This suggest that the poorest groups 
were the most adversely affected group by the devaluation. They would have faced a far lower 
cost of living increase had the devaluation not taken place. This could be due to a combination of 
changing preferences as a result of the rise in prices as well as previous consumption habits that 
might have forced them to give up some of the less essential items in order to keep on consuming 
their essentials. 
Finally, we perform a simple exercise to gauge the real impact of the devaluation on different 
types of households. We ask by how much a household’s nominal income would have to 
increase in May 2017 to keep that household at their 2015 real expenditure or income level. 
Table A5 reports these results for Cairo as an example. The top two rows report that actual total 
household expenditure and disposable income for the mean household in each quintile, and for 
the overall sample mean in 2015. 
In the bottom panel we inflate these values by the LPI, and by the counterfactual LPI absent 
the devaluation, to get the household expenditure (income) level in May 2017 that would have 
kept that household at the same real expenditure (income) level as in 2015. With the observed 
change in prices including the devaluation impact, the mean household would have needed about 
9,500 EGP more in May 2017 to stay at their 2015 expenditure level, and 11,600 EGP more to 
stay at their 2015 disposable income level. The counterfactual without devaluation would have 
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required far lower increases: only 4,300 EGP in expenditure and 5,300 EGP in income. Thus 
over 50% (30%) of the “necessary” increase in expenditure (income) between 2015 and May 
2017 to maintain the mean households’ real level was due to the devaluation alone.  
We also perform a similar analysis by income quintile. For all quintiles, 55% or more of the 
necessary increase in expenditure was due to the devaluation, except for the highest quintile 
where the share was 49%. The lowest quintile was hardest hit. The devaluation cost them 
2,500EGP more for their expenditure than they would have needed without it. Similar trends also 
appear for the disposable income with the lowest quintile suffering the most from the 
devaluation-requiring 40% more income just to offset its impact while the top quintile only 
required 25% more income to maintain their real income level of 2015. 
 
VI. Discussion 
Our paper aimed to offer policy makers critical information on the pass-through of exchange 
rate shocks to the prices of various commodities, the resulting welfare burden on households, and 
its incidence across socio-economic groups. Taking the November 2016 large-scale devaluation 
as a case study, we estimated the distributed lag effects of the devaluation on the prices of major 
commodity groups, and the consequences for households’ consumption patterns and welfare. We 
identified socio-economic groups that were affected most adversely by the devaluation, in terms 
of income level and region of residence. 
The results of our study offer policymakers an early estimate regarding the welfare impacts 
of the November 2016 devaluation. By identifying the welfare losses among the poorest 
households and by region, we hope to inform the policymaking agenda, and to spur discussion 
on how to channel public support to these groups in a targeted, effective manner. Our results can 
help to differentiate among the traditional means of intervention such as in-kind/cash transfers, 
subsidies, or trade instruments. 
We found that typically 4% of changes in the Egyptian Pound exchange rate are passed 
through to consumer prices immediately, and cumulatively approximately 9% are passed through 
over the first six months after devaluation. This pass through is highest for highly tradable goods 
including food, apparel and equipment, and is highest in the Rural Upper, Rural Lower and 
Urban Lower regions of Egypt. 
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The November 2016 devaluation caused price changes that had substantial welfare effects 
through increases in the Laspeyres price index and cost of living indices of households across the 
entire income distribution. The effect of devaluation accounted for a significant portion of the 
overall increase in these measures in the six months following the devaluation. Moreover, the 
devaluation-induced price changes produced systematic disparities across households in different 
regions and at different positions in the income distribution. The magnitude of these effects was 
as high as 50% of the overall increase in prices in Cairo, and the Lower and Upper Egypt. 
Analysis into the impact of the devaluation on households at different positions along the income 
distribution revealed that by all measures the households at the bottom of the distribution fared 
worse, consistently facing a lager impact of the devaluation on the increases in the prices they 
faced and their cost of living compared to those at the top.  
Our study followed well-accepted and robust methodologies, and led to results that have 
strong consistency properties and are statistically significant. Nevertheless, our discussion above 
points to several limitations and areas where research extensions would be invaluable. One, 
direct data on households’ post-devaluation consumption patterns was not available. In a follow 
up study, we aim to use the 2018 wave of the HIECS to test our predictions and offer estimates 
based on real pre- and post-devaluation data. Two, an important policy question concerns the 
effect of the devaluation on the position of households relative to the poverty threshold, and their 
transition in and out of consumption poverty. Three, given our strong results about regional and 
income-quintile differentials of welfare effects, question arises regarding additional demographic 
dimensions of the incidence of cost burdens due to the devaluation. This includes household 
composition, such as sex, age and educational level of the household head. Four, the analysis 
should be undertaken by households’ economic activity. This is important because currency 
fluctuations affect households’ consumption and welfare not only through expenditures, but also 
their earnings and non-market activities. These extensions will provide more precise evidence 
regarding the distributional effects of the currency devaluation on the Egyptian population. 
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Table 1. Impact propensities of exchange rate changes on prices, by commodity group and region 
 All regions Cairo Alexandria Canal cities Urban Lower Urban Upper Rural Lower Rural Upper Border 
All - CPI .044*** .020** .036** .029*** .024*** .025*** .034*** .037*** .027*** 
(s.e.) (.006) (.008) (.015) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.009) 
foodbev .045*** .026** .038** .032*** .027** .025** .034*** .042*** .023* 
(s.e.) (.006) (.013) (.015) (.010) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.010) (.012) 
alcoexp .084*** .055 .075** .066** .064* .065** .072** .066** .069* 
(s.e.) (.014) (.037) (.034) (.031) (.033) (.031) (.032) (.030) (.038) 
appexp .100*** .073*** .093*** .089*** .070** .086*** .091*** .096*** .094*** 
(s.e.) (.014) (.026) (.030) (.026) (.029) (.025) (.034) (.025) (.030) 
housexp .009* -.006 -.002 -.001 -.002 .001 .006 .002 -.004 
(s.e.) (.005) (.008) (.015) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) 
equipexp .338 .040*** .059*** .048*** .066*** 2.116*** .079*** .081*** .062*** 
(s.e.) (.248) (.015) (.018) (.015) (.017) (.178) (.018) (.018) (.017) 
medexp -.015 .036*** .061*** .030*** -.502*** .030*** .031*** .019* .015 
(s.e.) (.064) (.012) (.012) (.011) (.067) (.011) (.011) (.010) (.010) 
tranexp .124*** .116*** .124*** .115*** .115*** .117*** .098*** .105*** .116*** 
(s.e.) (.008) (.018) (.024) (.013) (.016) (.016) (.012) (.013) (.014) 
commexp -.005 -.015 -.010 -.013** -.018*** -.014** -.013** -.011* -.016** 
(s.e.) (.004) (.010) (.011) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.007) 
cultexp -.003 -.05*** -.025 -.035* -.037** -.037** -.016 -.010 -.030* 
(s.e.) (.011) (.019) (.027) (.018) (.017) (.015) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
educexp -.029*** -.07*** -.058** -.058*** -.060*** -.058*** -.053*** -.048*** -.07*** 
(s.e.) (.011) (.023) (.028) (.021) (.020) (.020) (.018) (.018) (.024) 
restoexp .033*** .019** .073*** .020** .018* .008 .008 .003 .021*** 
(s.e.) (.009) (.008) (.014) (.009) (.010) (.012) (.013) (.017) (.007) 
miscexp .024*** .004 .022 .018* .020* .015 .009 -.002 .011 
(s.e.) (.007) (.011) (.017) (.010) (.011) (.010) (.011) (.012) (.015) 
Notes: Coefficients interpreted as same-month %-point changes in the growth rate of prices from a 1%-point change 
in the growth rate of exchange rates. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% two sided test using standard errors 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity (in parentheses). Regression on all regions uses region-level population 
weights. 
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Table 2. Long-term propensities of exchange rate changes on prices, by comm. group and region 
 All regions Cairo Alexandria Canal cities Urban Lower Urban Upper Rural Lower Rural Upper Border 
All - CPI .144*** .087*** -.018 .069** .112*** .100*** .126*** .122*** .087*** 
(s.e.) (.021) (.021) (.174) (.033) (.025) (.021) (.024) (.023) (.032) 
foodbev .217*** .179*** .072 .142*** .189*** .193*** .194*** .197*** .150*** 
(s.e.) (.015) (.034) (.187) (.046) (.037) (.033) (.033) (.033) (.043) 
alcoexp .025 .512*** -.333 -.140 -.089 -.072 -.078 -.082 -.133 
(s.e.) (.162) (.151) (.298) (.091) (.082) (.078) (.084) (.080) (.098) 
appexp .097 .008 -.040 -.011 .009 .023 .267** .027 -.006 
(s.e.) (.151) (.059) (.225) (.073) (.089) (.056) (.102) (.056) (.074) 
housexp -.018 -.024 -.092 -.040 -.024 -.038 -.036 -.045 -.050** 
(s.e.) (.013) (.022) (.110) (.026) (.023) (.028) (.025) (.033) (.025) 
equipexp .401* .114*** .057 .103*** .146*** 2.028*** .146*** .151*** .107*** 
(s.e.) (.221) (.035) (.135) (.043) (.035) (.218) (.033) (.034) (.038) 
medexp .160 .047 .093 .012*** .574*** .055 .059* .054 .005 
(s.e.) (.137) (.035) (.141) (.044) (.112) (.034) (.035) (.036) (.039) 
tranexp .128*** .082* -.009 .064** .090** .093** .098*** .098*** .106*** 
(s.e.) (.021) (.042) (.202) (.040) (.040) (.037) (.034) (.033) (.035) 
commexp -.021* -.040* -.151 -.064** -.048** -.037** -.040** -.035* -.061** 
(s.e.) (.011) (.023) (.120) (.025) (.019) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.024) 
cultexp .297*** .285*** .012 .285*** .263*** .188*** .267*** .239*** .150*** 
(s.e.) (.029) (.059) (.305) (.088) (.054) (.043) (.048) (.045) (.055) 
educexp -.164*** -.25*** -.752** -.319*** -.231*** -.220*** -.214*** -.204*** -.32*** 
(s.e.) (.038) (.076) (.328) (.100) (.074) (.073) (.071) (.071) (.095) 
restoexp .055*** .049* .079 -.024 .024 .016 -.012 -.019 .021 
(s.e.) (.018) (.027) (.167) (.031) (.029) (.032) (.036) (.045) (.030) 
miscexp .107*** .066* -.132 .054 .086** .091** .057 .066 .051 
(s.e.) (.023) (.037) (.217) (.045) (.040) (.035) (.044) (.044) (.051) 
Notes: Coefficients interpreted as six-month %-point changes in the growth rate of prices from a one-time 1%-point 
change in the growth rate of exchange rates. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% two sided test using standard 
errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity (in parentheses). Regression on all regions uses region-level population 
weights. 
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Table 3: Laspeyres price index and inflation rates with and without devaluation, mean household by region 
    Actual Laspeyres/TCLI, Jan 2010=100 Laspeyres/TCLI absent devaluation, Jan 2010=100 
Region Year Month Laspeyres TCLI (0) TCLI (1)   Laspeyres TCLI (0) TCLI (1) 
Cairo 2016 12 233 247 241  229 242 236 
2017 5 276 289 286  248 263 260 
Alexandria 2016 12 253 270 261  244 260 251 
2017 5 285 303 289  341 335 331 
Canal Cities 2016 12 248 254 249  241 247 242 
2017 5 279 283 274  269 273 270 
Urban Lower 2016 12 249 254 256  256 259 267 
2017 5 283 284 284  256 257 257 
Urban Upper 2016 12 250 262 259  240 245 241 
2017 5 281 292 286  257 261 259 
Rural Lower 2016 12 253 256 253  245 247 244 
2017 5 291 295 287  263 267 264 
Rural Upper 2016 12 261 272 266  252 262 257 
2017 5 295 305 296  269 278 274 
Border 2016 12 278 287 269  270 278 261 
2017 5 319 328 303   299 306 287 
          
Region     Actual change in cost of living (%)   Change in cost of living, absent devaluation (%) 
Cairo   18.6 16.9 18.7  8.5 8.6 10.4 
Alexandria   12.7 12.5 10.7  39.5 29.0 32.1 
Canal Cities   12.5 11.6 10.1  11.6 10.5 11.5 
Urban Lower   13.3 12.1 10.9  0.0 -0.7 -3.8 
Urban Upper   12.2 11.5 10.5  7.1 6.8 7.2 
Rural Lower   14.9 15.4 13.6  7.4 7.8 7.9 
Rural Upper   13.2 12.4 11.2  6.9 6.4 6.7 
Border     14.5 14.2 12.8   10.7 10.0 10.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 12 commodity groups and 2008 fixed expenditure shares. Expenditure shares for each region calculated from HIECS 
2008/2009 as the mean expenditure share on each commodity group in that region. 
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Table 4: Laspeyres price index and inflation rates with and without devaluation, by quintile and region 
   Actual Laspeyres* index, Jan 2010=100  Laspeyres* index absent devaluation, Jan 2010=100 
Region Year Month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo 2016 12 233.3 234.6 234.1 234.1 227.9  228.2 229.9 229.3 229.7 224.4 
2017 5 287.4 283.5 281.2 279.0 265.2  249.5 249.7 248.7 249.4 243.1 
Alexandria 2016 12 261.7 260.3 256.6 252.0 244.7  251.7 250.8 247.0 243.3 236.9 
2017 5 298.5 295.6 289.7 285.6 273.8  327.0 341.1 332.0 333.6 346.8 
Canal Cities 2016 12 244.8 253.7 251.9 252.6 244.9  237.7 246.1 244.6 245.5 238.3 
2017 5 273.2 285.4 283.8 284.1 275.6  264.8 276.1 272.1 274.0 265.7 
Urban Lower 2016 12 253.4 254.0 250.7 249.7 243.0  259.2 259.2 256.9 256.5 252.5 
2017 5 288.5 288.7 284.1 282.7 274.1  260.0 261.5 257.6 256.1 249.8 
Urban Upper 2016 12 256.7 252.5 251.5 251.5 240.4  246.1 241.8 241.2 241.0 230.6 
2017 5 288.9 284.1 282.4 282.6 267.6  263.2 258.4 258.1 258.0 247.2 
Rural Lower 2016 12 257.4 254.6 254.2 252.6 247.3  248.7 246.3 246.1 244.7 239.6 
2017 5 295.1 292.5 292.5 290.9 284.1  268.3 264.7 264.5 262.8 256.9 
Rural Upper 2016 12 262.9 262.7 260.9 260.2 256.8  253.6 253.3 251.5 250.7 247.8 
2017 5 297.1 296.8 295.7 294.7 290.3  271.4 270.7 268.5 267.8 264.1 
Border 2016 12 290.1 271.1 283.9 270.6 275.1  280.8 263.8 275.1 263.0 266.5 
2017 5 330.1 312.0 325.1 310.2 315.1   314.8 288.6 305.7 289.0 294.7 
              
   Actual price inflation* (%)  Actual price inflation* absent devaluation (%) 
Region     Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo   23.2 20.8 20.1 19.2 16.4  9.3 8.6 8.5 8.6 8.3 
Alexandria   14.0 13.5 12.9 13.3 11.9  29.9 36.0 34.4 37.1 46.4 
Canal Cities   11.6 12.5 12.6 12.5 12.6  11.4 12.2 11.2 11.6 11.5 
Urban Lower   13.9 13.7 13.3 13.2 12.8  0.3 0.9 0.2 -0.2 -1.1 
Urban Upper   12.6 12.5 12.3 12.4 11.3  7.0 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.2 
Rural Lower   14.6 14.9 15.1 15.2 14.9  7.9 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.2 
Rural Upper   13.0 13.0 13.3 13.3 13.0  7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.6 
Border     13.8 15.1 14.5 14.6 14.5   12.1 9.4 11.1 9.9 10.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 12 commodity groups and 2008 fixed expenditure shares. Expenditure shares for each quintile-region calculated from 
HIECS 2008/2009 as the mean expenditure share on each commodity group in that quintile-region. 
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Table 5: Cost of living index based on fixed expenditure shares, and its changes, with & without devaluation, by quintile & region 
   Actual TCLI with fixed weights, Jan 2010=100  TCLI with fixed weights absent devaluation, Jan 2010=100 
Region Year Month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo 2016 12 256.3 247.9 242.6 243.9 236.3  250.1 242.5 237.3 238.7 232.0 
2017 5 312.5 294.6 285.7 285.5 270.2  275.1 263.8 257.4 259.2 250.8 
Alexandria 2016 12 273.8 270.0 280.4 253.1 253.3  263.2 259.9 269.0 244.4 244.6 
2017 5 311.5 305.4 317.0 284.1 281.6  326.7 330.7 341.8 308.7 320.8 
Canal Cities 2016 12 261.5 259.3 259.1 260.2 246.7  254.0 251.9 251.7 252.9 239.8 
2017 5 290.9 289.5 289.7 290.8 274.9  281.3 279.1 277.5 279.7 264.5 
Urban Lower 2016 12 260.3 254.4 254.7 255.7 241.9  264.9 258.0 259.2 260.7 248.4 
2017 5 293.5 285.6 285.4 286.7 269.2  263.3 258.0 257.9 258.4 244.4 
Urban Upper 2016 12 280.4 264.2 261.6 259.1 244.5  262.1 247.0 245.1 242.2 228.2 
2017 5 315.2 295.2 291.5 288.8 269.5  280.4 263.4 261.5 258.5 243.7 
Rural Lower 2016 12 263.3 258.9 256.6 252.5 244.3  254.3 250.3 248.1 244.3 236.5 
2017 5 302.8 298.7 296.6 291.8 281.2  274.4 269.8 267.7 263.3 254.2 
Rural Upper 2016 12 283.3 278.2 267.8 264.4 259.3  272.8 267.8 258.0 254.7 250.1 
2017 5 319.2 312.9 300.9 296.6 290.1  291.2 285.3 274.2 270.5 265.0 
Border 2016 12 326.9 272.6 283.9 272.1 283.7  315.8 265.3 275.2 264.2 274.4 
2017 5 375.4 310.7 323.1 309.5 324.6   352.7 288.9 302.4 288.6 302.3 
              
   Actual Change in Cost of Living (%)  Change in cost of Living absent devaluation (%) 
Region     Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo   21.9 18.8 17.8 17.1 14.4  10.0 8.8 8.5 8.6 8.1 
Alexandria   13.8 13.1 13.0 12.2 11.2  24.2 27.3 27.1 26.3 31.1 
Canal Cities   11.2 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.4  10.7 10.8 10.3 10.6 10.3 
Urban Lower   12.8 12.3 12.0 12.1 11.3  -0.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 -1.6 
Urban Upper   12.4 11.7 11.5 11.5 10.2  7.0 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.8 
Rural Lower   15.0 15.3 15.6 15.6 15.1  7.9 7.8 7.9 7.8 7.5 
Rural Upper   12.7 12.5 12.3 12.2 11.9  6.7 6.5 6.3 6.2 6.0 
Border     14.9 14.0 13.8 13.7 14.4   11.7 8.9 9.9 9.2 10.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 12 commodity groups and 2008 fixed expenditure shares. Expenditure shares for each quintile-region calculated from 
HIECS 2008/2009 as the mean expenditure share on each commodity group in that quintile-region. 
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Table 6: Cost of living index based on variable expenditure shares, and its changes, with & without devaluation, by quintile & region 
   Actual TCLI with variable weights, Jan 2010=100  TCLI with variable weights absent devaluation, Jan 2010=100 
Region Year Month Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo 
2016 12 252.5 246.2 238.6 240.8 227.1  245.8 240.5 233.0 235.9 222.9 
2017 5 310.9 302.1 283.0 288.0 260.4  272.7 268.6 255.7 261.2 243.8 
Alexandria 
2016 12 287.9 270.4 259.0 256.1 247.7  275.7 259.6 248.9 246.3 238.8 
2017 5 322.7 301.2 287.8 283.5 271.5  360.6 337.2 317.6 322.1 322.2 
Canal Cities 
2016 12 281.0 265.1 253.3 253.3 236.9  272.9 257.0 245.8 245.7 230.2 
2017 5 315.3 294.6 280.4 279.6 258.8  305.6 286.7 273.0 274.0 256.3 
Urban 
Lower 
2016 12 270.3 261.3 258.1 252.1 243.7  284.3 269.8 266.4 262.6 256.9 
2017 5 302.2 291.3 287.2 279.0 267.7  269.6 262.8 260.3 252.9 243.3 
Urban 
Upper 
2016 12 268.3 259.1 259.4 252.9 242.3  250.6 241.2 242.1 235.6 225.4 
2017 5 298.4 287.6 287.0 278.3 264.0  268.1 257.9 259.6 252.4 242.0 
Rural Lower 
2016 12 263.5 255.6 252.7 248.1 241.4  254.8 246.9 244.2 239.8 233.3 
2017 5 298.2 290.5 287.5 282.3 274.0  273.7 266.1 263.6 259.0 252.5 
Rural Upper 
2016 12 271.2 265.7 263.5 260.9 250.8  261.4 256.0 253.8 251.3 242.3 
2017 5 302.9 295.8 292.6 288.6 275.3  278.6 273.1 270.8 268.1 257.9 
Border 
2016 12 287.3 287.4 264.8 255.5 260.2  279.1 278.7 257.0 247.5 253.1 
2017 5 325.5 325.7 298.1 287.2 292.9   308.3 307.6 282.9 271.9 278.1 
              
   Actual change in cost of living (%)  Change in cost of living absent devaluation (%) 
Region     Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5   Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Cairo   23.1 22.7 18.6 19.6 14.7  10.9 11.7 9.7 10.8 9.4 
Alexandria   12.1 11.4 11.1 10.7 9.6  30.8 29.9 27.6 30.8 34.9 
Canal Cities   12.2 11.1 10.7 10.4 9.3  12.0 11.6 11.1 11.6 11.4 
Urban Lower  11.8 11.5 11.3 10.7 9.8  -5.2 -2.6 -2.3 -3.7 -5.3 
Urban Upper  11.2 11.0 10.7 10.0 9.0  7.0 6.9 7.2 7.2 7.4 
Rural Lower  13.2 13.7 13.8 13.8 13.5  7.4 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.2 
Rural Upper  11.7 11.3 11.0 10.6 9.8  6.6 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.4 
Border     13.3 13.3 12.5 12.4 12.5   10.5 10.4 10.0 9.9 9.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 12 commodity groups and variable expenditure shares. Expenditure shares for each quintile-region calculated from 
HIECS 2008/2009 as the mean expenditure share on each commodity group in that quintile-region.
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Figure 1. Month-to-month evolution of the exchange rate, and selected CPI components 
(EGP/USD; % growth) 
 
Notes: CPI components, year-to-year, are on the left axis; exchange rate on the right axis. CPI basket using base 
period 1999/2000. CPI basket changed in September 2007 (base period January 2007) and January 2010 (base 
period January 2010), and so prices are not entirely comparable between 07.05-08.07, 09.07-12.09, and 01.10.-
09.17. Source: Central Bank of Egypt. CPI components available from July 2005. 
 
Figure 2. Month-to-month evolution of the growth rates in key variables 
 
Notes: Oct-Nov 2016 growth rate in exchange rate, of 0.807, is omitted for clarity of presentation. 
 
Figure 3. Pass through of a 100% devaluation to CPI in the same month and over 6 months 
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i. By commodity group     ii. By region 
Notes: Suppose all commodity groups (and all regions) have CPI=100 in year t=-1. When EGP is devalued by 100% 
in year t=0, the impact on prices deepens over the next 6 months. Coefficients leading to these time trends are shown 
in tables 1–2, and A3–A4. Confidence interval for equipment price index (on average ±1.98×22.680 across the 
months 0–6) and Alexandria (on average ±1.98×16.094 across the months 0–6) are omitted for clarity of 
presentation of other results. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Data sources and summary statistics 
Survey wave Fieldwork Source Households 
Mean expenditures 
per capita (st.dev.)a 
Med. expend. 
per cap. 
HIECS 2008/09 01.04.08-30.03.09 OAMDI 2014ab 23,428 3,249 (2,992) 2,516 
HIECS 2010/11 01.07.10-30.06.11 OAMDI 2014b  7,719 3,780 (3,381) 2,943 
HIECS 2012/13 01.07.12-30.06.13 OAMDI 2014c  7,525 3,911 (3,075) 3,068 
HIECS 2015 01.01.15-30.12.15 OAMDI 2014d 11,988 5,221 (5,289) 4,024 
a Converted to year-2012 purchasing-power parity international dollars (World Bank 2018a,b). Summary statistics 
account for household sampling weights and household size. 
b ERF data are 30-50% random extractions from original HIECS surveys administered by Egyptian Central Agency 
for Public Mobilization and Statistics, which include 48,658 (HIECS 2008/2009), 26,500 (HIECS 2010/2011), 
24,863 households (HIECS 2012/2013), and 23,976 (HIECS 2015). 
 
Table A2. Tradable commodities’ share of expenditures by hhd residence and income decile 
 2008 2010 2012 2015 
Income decile Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban 
1 0.903b 0.880ab 0.839b 0.770a 0.831b 0.756a 0.826b 0.783ab 
 
(0.076) (0.072) (0.091) (0.161) (0.112) (0.194) (0.090) (0.144) 
2 0.879b 0.856ab 0.820b 0.777ac 0.798d 0.760a 0.790d 0.746ab 
 
(0.063) (0.080) (0.091) (0.119) (0.101) (0.140) (0.104) (0.122) 
3 0.864c 0.839ac 0.805c 0.758a 0.787 0.748ad 0.781c 0.725a 
 
(0.087) (0.080) (0.082) (0.118) (0.108) (0.114) (0.093) (0.125) 
4 0.858 0.832ab 0.790 0.748a 0.787b 0.730a 0.773b 0.715ad 
 
(0.077) (0.085) (0.099) (0.110) (0.086) (0.123) (0.096) (0.130) 
5 0.855b 0.818ab 0.788 0.743a 0.767 0.724a 0.757 0.705a 
 
(0.077) (0.089) (0.100) (0.115) (0.095) (0.125) (0.107) (0.129) 
6 0.845c 0.805ab 0.779 0.730ab 0.766 0.716a 0.753b 0.701a 
 
(0.083) (0.094) (0.096) (0.116) (0.101) (0.129) (0.098) (0.125) 
7 0.838b 0.792ab 0.771b 0.702a 0.759b 0.709ad 0.735c 0.685ab 
 
(0.086) (0.109) (0.091) (0.135) (0.116) (0.148) (0.106) (0.133) 
8 0.824b 0.770ab 0.743c 0.711ab 0.735c 0.691ab 0.719b 0.659ad 
 
(0.104) (0.123) (0.134) (0.116) (0.124) (0.120) (0.126) (0.138) 
9 0.808b 0.745ab 0.725c 0.683ab 0.717b 0.658ab 0.697b 0.661ab 
 
(0.122) (0.133) (0.140) (0.137) (0.130) (0.156) (0.143) (0.145) 
10 0.777 0.669a 0.687 0.609a 0.673 0.612a 0.648 0.562a 
 
(0.165) (0.174) (0.181) (0.181) (0.210) (0.177) (0.179) (0.185) 
Mean share (standard deviation) shown. a The difference of rural and urban means at any income decile is significant 
at the 1% level. The difference of means between an income decile and the following decile is significant at (b) 1%, 
(c) 5% or (d) 10%. The differences in means are tested assuming pairs of independent samples with equal variances, 
which appears satisfied for rural-urban pairs as well as pairs of income decile groups.  
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Table A3. Results of exchange-rate pass-through regressions: all commodity groups, by region 
 
All 
regions Cairo Alexandria 
Canal 
cities 
Urban 
Lower 
Urban 
Upper 
Rural 
Lower 
Rural 
Upper Border 
𝑃?̇? .202 .718*** .147 .621*** .648*** .663*** .610*** .571*** .595*** 
 (.147) (.187) (.144) (.190) (.196) (.185) (.194) (.180) (.199) 
?̇?𝑡 .044*** .020** .036** .029*** .024*** .025*** .034*** .037*** .027*** 
 (.006) (.008) (.015) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.009) 
?̇?𝑡 .136* .102 .236 .084 .309 .169 .172 .255 .260 
 (.082) (.181) (.215) (.207) (.211) (.184) (.235) (.219) (.221) 
?̇?𝑡−1 .010 .004 -.190 .044*** .002 -.001 .057*** -.005 -.019 
 (.017) (.005) (.210) (.007) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.016) 
?̇?𝑡−2 .031*** .029*** .087* -.054* .036*** .030*** -.020*** .041*** .032*** 
 (.011) (.003) (.053) (.028) (.004) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.004) 
?̇?𝑡−3 .019*** .007* .015** .021*** .010* .009* .017** .011* .011** 
 (.003) (.004) (.007) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.007) (.006) (.005) 
?̇?𝑡−4 .013*** .010** -.009 .013** .013* .011* .016** .011 .009 
 (.003) (.005) (.018) (.005) (.007) (.006) (.007) (.007) (.006) 
?̇?𝑡−5 .023*** .019*** .038 .013 .030*** .026*** .021** .029*** .028*** 
 (.004) (.007) (.023) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.010) (.010) (.009) 
?̇?𝑡−6 .005 -.004 .005 .004 -.002 .000 .001 -.002 -.000 
 (.003) (.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.005) (.006) 
?̇?𝑡−1 .255** .158 .173 .197 .102 .118 .291 .160 .093 
 (.106) (.202) (.234) (.258) (.238) (.236) (.282) (.280) (.246) 
?̇?𝑡−2 .046 .038 -.069 .089 .064 .114 .133 .116 -.005 
 (.066) (.189) (.201) (.195) (.215) (.180) (.205) (.192) (.217) 
?̇?𝑡−3 -.147* -.074 -.067 -.126 -.068 -.093 -.216 -.113 .002 
 (.076) (.166) (.207) (.193) (.207) (.184) (.209) (.208) (.214) 
?̇?𝑡−4 -.125 .021 -.135 .024 -.048 -.027 .033 .008 -.101 
 (.099) (.173) (.219) (.187) (.197) (.176) (.225) (.215) (.210) 
?̇?𝑡−5 -.015 .154 -.057 .029 .176 .113 .049 .047 .073 
 (.100) (.183) (.219) (.183) (.198) (.185) (.215) (.204) (.191) 
?̇?𝑡−6 .172 -.193 .228 -.170 -.146 -.122 -.154 -.069 -.086 
 (.125) (.198) (.189) (.211) (.231) (.211) (.244) (.234) (.218) 
Constant .004*** .001 .005** .002 .001 .001 .002 .002 .002 
 (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
Observs. 816 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 102 
R-squared .307 .729 .239 .679 .657 .697 .659 .641 .629 
Notes: Coefficients interpreted as %-point changes in the growth rate of prices from a 1%-point change in the 
growth rate of control variables. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% two sided test using standard errors robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity (in parentheses). Regression on all regions uses region-level population weights. 
Regressions by region and commodity group available on request. 
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Table A4. Results of exchange-rate pass-through regressions: all regions, by commodity group 
 foodbev alcoexp appexp housexp equipexp medexp tranexp commexp cultexp educexp restoexp miscexp 
𝑃?̇? .186 .357* .265* .128 .137 .163 .236 .136 .344 .431 .336 .264 
 (.133) (.216) (.157) (.091) (.107) (.189) (.159) (.092) (.240) (.272) (.223) (.181) 
?̇?𝑡 .045*** .084*** .100*** .009* .338 -.015 .124*** -.005 -.003 -.029*** .033*** .024*** 
 (.006) (.014) (.014) (.005) (.248) (.064) (.008) (.004) (.011) (.011) (.009) (.007) 
?̇?𝑡 .386*** 1.037*** -.089 -.100 -.447** -.131 .003 .104* -.426*** -.151 -.240 .264** 
 (.133) (.355) (.248) (.131) (.198) (.176) (.086) (.053) (.090) (.255) (.154) (.106) 
?̇?𝑡−1 .019* -.176** -.137 -.022*** -.036 .183 -.041*** -.021** -.040** -.087*** -.001 -.043** 
 (.011) (.081) (.088) (.007) (.037) (.128) (.013) (.008) (.019) (.027) (.007) (.019) 
?̇?𝑡−2 .067*** .148 .166 .001 .092*** -.014 .011 .000 .033*** -.003 .024*** .061*** 
 (.005) (.147) (.130) (.005) (.007) (.020) (.009) (.003) (.008) (.007) (.007) (.007) 
?̇?𝑡−3 .021*** -.014 -.007 -.003 .038 .014 .051*** .000 -.010** -.019*** .009 .047*** 
 (.004) (.021) (.020) (.004) (.026) (.009) (.004) (.002) (.005) (.007) (.006) (.004) 
?̇?𝑡−4 .020*** .033** -.047*** .001 -.033* .023 -.011*** .003** .037*** -.025*** .001 .004 
 (.003) (.013) (.014) (.004) (.020) (.014) (.004) (.002) (.004) (.006) (.003) (.005) 
?̇?𝑡−5 .043*** -.026 .030* .008 .019** -.020 -.002 -.001 .025*** -.004 -.004 .015*** 
 (.005) (.020) (.016) (.005) (.009) (.012) (.005) (.003) (.009) (.006) (.007) (.005) 
?̇?𝑡−6 .002 -.024 -.008 -.012*** -.017*** -.012** -.004 .002 .256*** .003 -.008 -.001 
 (.004) (.015) (.014) (.004) (.006) (.005) (.004) (.002) (.016) (.008) (.005) (.004) 
?̇?𝑡−1 .472*** -1.405*** -.193 .063 .164 .302 .115 .060 .047 .045 .272 -.366*** 
 (.152) (.489) (.306) (.128) (.202) (.295) (.101) (.076) (.111) (.220) (.222) (.124) 
?̇?𝑡−2 -.001 .772** -.079 .279** .050 -.126 -.280*** -.198*** .233** .447* -.722*** -.001 
 (.126) (.300) (.131) (.125) (.166) (.159) (.087) (.066) (.101) (.258) (.194) (.123) 
?̇?𝑡−3 -.236* 1.108** .583*** -.408*** .160 -.471*** .063 .035 -.331*** .014 .738*** -.358*** 
 (.129) (.474) (.143) (.095) (.104) (.152) (.068) (.046) (.089) (.165) (.173) (.125) 
?̇?𝑡−4 -.159 .550** -.110 -.027 -.034 -.220* .147* .091** -.074 -.529* -.815*** .198* 
 (.155) (.246) (.129) (.089) (.195) (.117) (.088) (.042) (.102) (.270) (.270) (.120) 
?̇?𝑡−5 .103 -1.424** .062 .068 -.238 -.010 -.583** -.143** .115 -.022 .073 -.194* 
 (.143) (.635) (.160) (.105) (.161) (.118) (.228) (.062) (.142) (.169) (.250) (.103) 
?̇?𝑡−6 .006 2.538*** .014 .177 .079 .274 .851*** .056 -.149 .485* .658*** -.137 
 (.147) (.730) (.144) (.119) (.154) (.179) (.317) (.079) (.196) (.274) (.228) (.144) 
Const. .005*** .006** .002 .003** .003 .004** .001 -.001 .001 .008*** .006*** .004** 
 (.001) (.003) (.002) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002) 
Obs. 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 
R-sq. .298 .176 .196 .096 .172 .182 .297 .155 .466 .150 .254 .207 
Notes: Coefficients interpreted as %-point changes in the growth rate of prices from a 1%-point change in the 
growth rate of control variables. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% two sided test using standard errors robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity (in parentheses). Regressions use region-level population weights. Regressions by region 
and commodity group available on request. 
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Table A5: Example of Impact of devaluation on mean expenditures and disposable incomes by quintile, Cairo 
Mean expenditure/disposable income 2015 prices 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Mean 
 TOTEXP 18,078 26,631 33,059 41,371 94,142 50,855 
 TOTDINC 22,053 31,977 35,169 47,987 120,543 62,445 
        
Inflated to May 2017 prices by 
TOTEXP Laspeyres PI 22,273.81 32,176.22 39,711.32 49,305.37 109,564.84 60,337.81 
 Laspeyres absent devaluation 19,765.27 28,926.22 35,861.21 44,928.95 101,987.68 55,178.62 
 
Difference in amount needed to 
stay at same EXP with and 
without devaluation 
2,508.54 3,250.00 3,850.11 4,376.41 7,577.16 5,159.19 
TOTDINC Laspeyres PI 27,171.07 38,635.26 42,245.08 57,190.35 140,292.04 74,089.16 
 Laspeyres absent devaluation 24,111 34,733 38,149 52,114 130,590 67,754.16 
 
Difference in amount needed to 
stay at same EXP with and 
without devaluation 
3,060.08 3,902.40 4,095.76 5,076.30 9,702.16 6,335.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on 12 commodity groups and 2008 fixed expenditure shares. Expenditure shares for each quintile calculated from HIECS 
2008/2009 as the mean expenditure share on each commodity group in that quintile.
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Figure A1. Month-to-month fluctuation in the exchange rate, and selected CPI components 
 
Notes: CPI inflation components (×100%) are annualized. 
Source: Central Bank of Egypt. Harmonized CPI components available from January 2011. 
